Compulsory versus voluntary voting : an experimental study
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Duffy, John |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 84.2014, p. 111-131
|
Subject: | Voting behavior | Voting mechanisms | Condorcet Jury model | Information aggregation | Laboratory experiments | Experiment | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making |
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