Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
The Lemke-Howson algorithm for computing equilibria of finite 2-person non-cooperative games in normal form is modified to restrict the computations to the ordinarily small portion corresponding to the strategies actually used by the players, and further it is shown that in games with perfect recall these strategies can be generated as needed from an auxiliary analysis of the players' decision trees derived from the extensive form of the game.
Year of publication: |
1972
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Authors: | Wilson, Robert |
Published in: |
Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909. - Vol. 18.1972, 7, p. 448-460
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Publisher: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS |
Saved in:
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