Computing profit-maximizing bid shading factors in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fagandini, Paulo ; Dierickx, Ingemar |
Published in: |
Computational economics. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9974, ZDB-ID 1477445-8. - Vol. 61.2023, 3, p. 1009-1035
|
Subject: | Asymmetric agents | Auctions | Bidding | Naive bidders | Winner's curse |
Description of contents: | Description [doi.org] |
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