Concealment and verification over environmental regulations : a game-theoretic analysis
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
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Authors: | Lee, Dongryul ; Baik, Kyung Hwan |
Published in: |
Journal of regulatory economics. - Norwell, Mass. [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0922-680X, ZDB-ID 1027173-9. - Vol. 51.2017, 3, p. 235-268
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Subject: | Environmental regulations | Concealment | Verification | Monitoring | Fines | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Umweltstandard | Environmental standard | Umweltökonomik | Environmental economics |
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