Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Potthoff, Richard F. |
Published in: |
Games. - MDPI, Open Access Journal, ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 5.2014, 4, p. 204-233
|
Publisher: |
MDPI, Open Access Journal |
Subject: | Condorcet completion methods | strategic voting | manipulable | cyclical majorities | approval voting | mathematical induction |
Extent: | application/pdf text/html |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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Potthoff, Richard F., (2014)
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Potthoff, Richard F., (2014)
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Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games
Cartwright, Edward J., (2014)
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Potthoff, Richard F., (2014)
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