Conflict in the wage-led growth model

We model the interaction between capitalists and entrepreneurs as a dynamic game. The open-loop Nash equilibrium and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium are distinguished. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well as the level and responsiveness of the wage rate to the accumulation of capital are shown to be important for wage-led growth.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Correa, Romar
Publisher:	Kiel : Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Subject:	capital accumulation \| conflict: cooperation

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Series:	Economics Discussion Papers ; 2014-41
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	799013692 [GVK] hdl:10419/103209 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201441 [RePEc]
Classification:	B51 - Socialist; Marxian; Sraffian ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420876