Connected Coalitions, Pólya Sequences and Voting Power Indices
We look at the power of players in a voting game in which only certain coalitions are allowed due to, e.g., ideological constraints. Voting on a one-dimensional spectrum is an example. Edelman's (1997) model of voting on a convex set is supplemented with a probability model for generating coalitions. Connected coalitions are generated by means of sequences of binary Pólya variables. An extended parametrized version of the Shapley-Shubik voting power index is derived.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Berg, Sven ; Perlinger, Thommy |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 16.2000, p. 391-403
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
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