The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism : asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Deb, Rajat ; Razzolini, Laura ; Seo, Tae-kun |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 10.2006, 3, p. 205-232
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Kostenverrechnung | Cost allocation | Theorie | Theory |
-
Data games : sharing public goods with exclusion
Dehez, Pierre, (2008)
-
Public goods provision : unit-by-unit-sharing rules and the core
Yu, Yan, (2005)
-
The power of small coalitions in cost sharing
Schoppmann, Florian, (2008)
- More ...
-
Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability pay and free provision of an indivisible public good
Deb, Rajat, (2003)
-
On the microtheoretic foundations of Cagan's demand for money function
Deb, Rajat, (2008)
-
Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
Deb, Rajat, (2010)
- More ...