Consistent beliefs, learning and different equilibria in oligopolistic markets

The aim of this paper is to show the relation among equilibria in models with different levels of rationality. The different levels of rationality are defined in terms of the number of iterations that a player can perform with a simple rule for updating beliefs. It is shown that the rule converges to the Nash equilibrium without any increase in the complexity of players.

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Year of publication:	1996-10
Authors:	Martos, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba
Institutions:	Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE)
Subject:	Consistent beliefs \| learning \| rationality level

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers. Serie AD.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published by Ivie 32 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542851