Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency
A unanimously adopted democratic constitution is a contract between the people as principal and the government as agent. However, none of the incentive devices employed in private principal-agent contracting assure enforcement of a constitution. Under majority voting, candidates for the job of agent cannot win the job without promising tobreak the contract, and the agent cannot be re-elected unless he keeps that promise. Copyright George Mason University 1990
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Merville, Larry ; Osborne, Dale |
Published in: |
Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 1.1990, 3, p. 21-47
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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