Constitutional design and economic performance
This paper is motivated by the belief that some cultural traits favor economic performance more than others. One trait examined is the ease with which individuals in a community drift away from the spirit of the law for their own benefit; this, it is argued, generates verbose legislation and high-transaction-cost institutions with deleterious effects on economic performance. An empirical comparison between the number of articles in a country's constitution, as a proxy for length and lack of simplicity, and economic performance as measured by GDP per capita finds that no country with a high GDP per capita has a long constitution or, restated, that long constitutions are invariably associated with low levels of GDP per capita. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Montenegro, Alvaro |
Published in: |
Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 6.1995, 2, p. 161-169
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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