Constitutional design and regional favoritism
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zantman, Wilfried Sand- |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 4.2002, 1, p. 71-93
|
Subject: | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Region | Diskriminierung | Discrimination | Dezentralisierung | Decentralization | Theorie | Theory |
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