Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs.
According to many democracy theorists, there is an unavoidable trade-off between constitutionalism and the need for political action. This paper criticizes that belief. Rather, it argues that a division of power, while sometimes entailing high political transaction costs, can nevertheless be beneficial and that it is not necessarily the case that a division of power does entail high transaction costs. The analysis expands the framework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Constitutionalism is thus defended against one of its main perceived deficiencies: its bringing about gridlock. This does not always happen, and when it does, it is often a good thing. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Berggren, Niclas ; Karlson, Nils |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 117.2003, 1-2, p. 99-124
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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