Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
Year of publication: |
October 2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bianchi, Francesco |
Other Persons: | Melosi, Leonardo (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Politische Kommunikation | Political communication | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Inflationserwartung | Inflation expectations | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Reputation | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w20566 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w20566 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Bianchi, Francesco, (2013)
-
Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Bianchi, Francesco, (2014)
-
Constrained discretion and central bank transparency
Bianchi, Francesco, (2014)
- More ...
-
Hitting the Elusive Inflation Target
Bianchi, Francesco, (2019)
-
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Times of Large Debt : Unity is Strength
Bianchi, Francesco, (2020)
-
The Dire Effects of the Lack of Monetary and Fiscal Coordination
Bianchi, Francesco, (2017)
- More ...