Constrained-Optimal Strategy-Proof Assignment: Beyond the Groves Mechanisms
A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We o¤er an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto- optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter in
nite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Sprumont, Yves |
Institutions: | Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ) |
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