Constrained Persuasion with private information
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Kosenko, Andrew |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 23.2023, 1, p. 345-370
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Subject: | communication | information design | information provision | information transmission | persuasion | signaling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Kommunikation | Communication | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour |
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