Consumers’ choice of the services of Islamic banks in dual banking system

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine how the Islamic banks fix their mark-up for Murabaha contract strategically when traditional banks also co-exist in a country. This study also aims to investigate what role the varying degree of Iman (faith) plays in shaping the preferences of the consumers to choose between the services of Islamic banks and the traditional banks. Design/methodology/approach: This paper constructs a mathematical model like the Bertrand competition in neo-classical economic theory. A religiosity parameter for the consumers has been inserted into their demand functions for their products. A simple optimization technique from mathematics has been used to arrive at the results. Findings: This paper applies game theory to analyze how Islamic banks determine their mark-up when they are facing competition with traditional banks. It considers the demand functions of the consumers for the products of Islamic banks and traditional banks. The demand functions depend on the mark-up, as well as on the interest rate with the difference that they also depend on the religiosity of the consumers. The paper shows that Islamic, as well as the conventional banks charge lower prices for their loans if there is consideration of religiosity aspect of the consumers. Further, it shows that as religiosity increases in a country, the lending rates decrease. The theoretical result is also consistent with the real practices of the banks. Therefore, the dual banking system is welfare enhancing for the customers. Research limitations/implications: The Islamic banks can leverage the religiosity aspect of the consumers and expand their business competitively by charging them lower mark-up. The adherence of religious customers to the services of Islamic banks creates some kind of loyalty premium for them. This could lead to the reduction of mark-up price triggering competition between both types of banks to attract more customers. Therefore, it is prudent for the government to develop a system for furthering the quality of honesty that is an integral part of Islam. Originality/value: To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first paper where it has been analyzed theoretically how the Islamic banks determine their mark-up for Murabaha contract strategically. This approach explains why the rate of return of Islamic banks hinges on the interest rates of traditional banks. One of the novel feature of this paper is that religiosity character of the consumer is good for banks because religiosity prohibits the people to default on their loans.