Contest success functions: an extension

This note extends the axiomatic characterization of the "power" success function in fair contests by Skaperdas (1996) to an unfair contest. We show that the results previously obtained are straightforward to generalize; the success function is uniquely characterized by Luce's Choice Axiom (implying independence of irrelevant alternatives) and homogeneity of degree zero.

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Year of publication:	1997-11-17
Authors:	Riis, Christian ; Clark, Derek J.
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 11.1997, 1, p. 201-204
Publisher:	Springer

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Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 1, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371086