Contests with bilateral delegation : unobservable contracts
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Baik, Kyung Hwan ; Kim, Jihyun |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 170.2014, 3, p. 387-405
|
Subject: | Contest | Delegation | Unobservable contract | Contingent compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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