Contests With Participant-Dependent Prizes

We study contests in which the prize depends on the number of participants, and show that equilibrium effort can be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the number of participants. This contrasts with the standard result for contests with fixed prizes in which effort is decreasing in the number of participants

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	de Roos, Nicolas ; Matros, Alexander ; Smirnov, Vladimir
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (6 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 15, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3804612 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235149