Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
We derive continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary dynamics in games. Depending on how we construct the continuous limit, we obtain a continuous approxi-mation that is either an ordinary differential equation (ODE) or a stochastic differential equation (SDE). Our SDE approximation result provides the first derivation of a SDE from an underlying discrete stochastic evolutionary game model. In deriving both an ODE and a SDE limit from the same model, our results provide information regarding the conditions under which the different limits arise.
Authors: | Corradi, Valentina ; Sarin, Rajiv |
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Institutions: | ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE), Department of Economics |
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