Continuous-Time Strategy Selection in Linear Population Games
In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish between a situation in which the subjects are completely informed about the payoff function and a situation in which they are incompletely informed. We observe that subjects spend the greater part of the time at or near the efficient state. If the efficient state is an equilibrium, they spend more time there than otherwise. Furthermore, incomplete information increases the time spent at the efficient state. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Berninghaus, Siegfried ; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin ; Keser, Claudia |
Published in: |
Experimental Economics. - Springer, ISSN 1386-4157. - Vol. 2.1999, 1, p. 41-57
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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