Continuous virtual implementation : complete information
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jain, Ritesh ; Lombardi, Michele |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 99.2022, p. 1-10
|
Subject: | Common knowledge | Continuous implementation | Social choice rules | Uniform-weak topology | Virtual implementation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information |
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