Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information.
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | MacLeod, W. Bentley ; Malcomson, James M. |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 28.1995, 2, p. 336-67
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Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
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