Contract design with limited commitment
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Gretschko, Vitali ; Wambach, Achim |
Publisher: |
Mannheim : Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |
Subject: | Principal-Agent models | renegotiation | commitment | Coase-conjecture |
Series: | ZEW Discussion Papers ; 18-054 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1043604227 [GVK] hdl:10419/190569 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:zewdip:18054 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Contract design with limited commitment
Gretschko, Vitali, (2018)
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Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values
Gretschko, Vitali, (2017)
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Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values
Gretschko, Vitali, (2017)
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Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation
Gretschko, Vitali, (2015)
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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism
Wambach, Achim, (2013)
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Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen
Gretschko, Vitali, (2021)
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