Contract design with socially attentive preferences
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Koch, Simon ; Weinschenk, Philipp |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 130.2021, p. 591-601
|
Subject: | Agency model | Incentives | Socially attentive preferences | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Anreiz |
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