Contract Duration and the Division of Labor in Agricultural Land Leases

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

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Year of publication:	2005-05
Authors:	Yoder, Jonathan ; Hossain, Ishrat ; Epplin, Francis ; Doye, Damona
Institutions:	School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
Subject:	repeated auction \| land lease contracts \| moral hazard \| contract duration \| division of labor

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 2005-5 19 pages
Classification:	J43 - Agricultural Labor Markets ; L23 - Organization of Production ; Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005227042