Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Göller, Daniel |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 175.2019, 4, p. 736-764
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Subject: | incomplete contracts | mechanism design | holdup | renegotiation | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Vertrag | Contract | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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