Contracting for information under imperfect commitment
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Krishna, Vijay ; Morgan, John |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 39.2008, 4, p. 905-925
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Theorie | Theory |
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