Contracting, gatekeepers, and unverifiable performance
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dearden, James A. ; Klotz, Dorothy E. |
Published in: |
The Rand journal of economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0741-6261, ZDB-ID 798131-4. - Vol. 33.2002, 4, p. 723-740
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Theorie | Theory |
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