Contracting in a continuous-time model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies
Year of publication: |
February 2018
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Authors: | Yang, Nian ; Yang, Jun ; Chen, Yu |
Publisher: |
[Graz] : Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz |
Subject: | optimal contracting | moral hazard in teams | cost synergies | continuoustime model | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Synergie | Synergy | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Graz economics papers : GEP. - Graz, ZDB-ID 2677671-6. - Vol. GEP 2018, 06 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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