Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tangerås, Thomas P. ; Gick, Wolfgang |
Publisher: |
Stockholm : Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) |
Subject: | Constrained contracting | Escape clauses | Endogenously incomplete commitment | Ratchet effect | Revelation principle |
Series: | IFN Working Paper ; 1390 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 1759773719 [GVK] hdl:10419/240533 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1390 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: |
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