Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the single agent case
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Bester, Helmut ; Strausz, Roland |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 69.2001, 4, p. 1077-1098
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Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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