Contracts and Productive Information Gathering.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Khalil, F ; Rochet, J-C
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Washington
Subject:	ECONOMETRICS \| INFORMATION \| CONTRACTS \| DECISION MAKING

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Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618499