CONTRACTS ARE DIFFERENT FROM REPEATED GAMES.
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | O'FLAHERTY, B. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences |
Subject: | game theory | economic equilibrium | contracts |
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Rubinstein, A., (1992)
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On a Potential Game for Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures.
Qin, C.Z., (1992)
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