Contracts : the theory of dynamic principal-agent relationships and the continuous-time approach
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sannikov, Yuliy |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN 1-107-01604-5. - 2013, p. 89-124
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
-
Obloj, Tomasz, (2015)
-
Entrepreneurial experiences from venture capital funding : exploring two-sided information asymmetry
Glücksman, Sarah, (2020)
-
What drives royalty rates in international franchising?
Zeißler, Jennifer, (2023)
- More ...
-
Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
Sannikov, Yuliy, (2007)
-
International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities
Brunnermeier, Markus K, (2015)
-
International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities
Brunnermeier, Markus K.,
- More ...