Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gao, Zhan ; Hwang, Yuhchang ; Wu, Wan-Ting |
Published in: |
Journal of contemporary accounting & economics. - Kidlington [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1815-5669, ZDB-ID 2539795-3. - Vol. 13.2017, 3, p. 282-303
|
Subject: | CEO compensation | Contract design | Performance metrics | Relative performance evaluation | Performance period | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Vertrag | Contract |
-
Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation
Jiménez-Angueira, Carlos E., (2015)
-
An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex, (2017)
-
Do cash-flow performance metrics in CEOs' compensation contracts enhance firm innovation?
Dong, Qi, (2024)
- More ...
-
Performance Periods in CEO Performance-Based Equity Awards : Theory and Evidence
Evans, John, (2017)
-
Performance periods in CEO performance-based equity awards : theory and evidence
Evans, John Harry, (2018)
-
Contractual Features of CEO Performance-Vested Equity Compensation
Gao, Zhan, (2017)
- More ...