Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 46.2010, 5 (20.9.), p. 807-816
|
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Produktqualität | Product quality | Investition | Investment | Risiko | Risk | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract |
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