Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment.
The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aizenman, Joshua ; Yi, Sang-Seung |
Published in: |
Review of Development Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 2.1998, 1, p. 1-10
|
Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Regret theory and policy reform
Aizenman, Joshua, (1998)
-
Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment
Aizenman, Joshua, (1997)
-
Controlled openness and foreign direct investment
Aizenman, Joshua, (1998)
- More ...