Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price set at the lowest bidder valuation.

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Year of publication:	2007-04
Authors:	Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
Institutions:	Indian Statistical Institute
Subject:	Auctions \| ceilings \| collusion \| reserve prices

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	11 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D4 - Market Structure and Pricing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979303