Controlling collusion in auctions: The role of ceilings and reserve prices

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price set at the lowest bidder valuation.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 98.2008, 3, p. 240-246
Publisher:	Elsevier

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005095295