Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks

This paper deals with the evolution of conventions in a finite population of boundedly rational players. We apply methods from the theory of automata networks to analyze the effects of different interaction structures. It is shown that the size of the reference group for each player has an important impact on the evolutionary stability of a particular convention, and that the interaction structure crucially determines the distribution of conventions in the population.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Schwalbe, Ulrich ; Berninghaus, Siegfried K.
Published in:	Journal of Evolutionary Economics. - Springer. - Vol. 6.1996, 3, p. 297-312
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Conventions

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169464