Cooperation and effort in group contests

Gil S. Epstein and Yosef Mealem

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime. -- Contests ; rent seeking ; public good ; easy-riding

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef
Publisher:	[Ramat-Gan : Bar-Ilan Univ., Dep. of Economics]
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 14 S., 447 KB)
Series:	Department working papers / Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics. - Ramat-Gan : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2480956-1. - Vol. 2011-28]
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/96080 [Handle]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009383068