Cooperative Harvesting and Core Allocations in Fisheries

The use of renewable resources is examined as a cooperative production game, the focus here being on fisheries. It is shown how pooling and exchange of individual endowments may open for substitutions that generate greater efficiency. We introduce a sharing rule that complies with the core concept, applied to heterogeneous multi-species fisheries with transferable utility.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003-05-07
Authors:	Bardarson, Hermann
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	Resource management \| fisheries \| heterogeneity \| linear programming \| cooperative games \| core allocations \| substitution possibilities \| common property

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers in Economics Number 07/03 11 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; Q22 - Fishery
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914354