Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Year of publication: |
2004-09
|
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Authors: | Mailath, George J. ; Morris, Stephen |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | Repeated games | Private monitoring | Almost-public monitoring | Coordination | Bounded recall |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The price is None Number 1479R 35 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J., (2006)
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
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