Coordination of tax policies toward inward foreign direct investment
type="main" xml:lang="en"> <title type="main">Abstract</title> <p>We study competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) between host countries and the implications of tax policy coordination between them. By reducing its tax on multinational production, a host country can attract additional FDI, some of which is diverted from other host countries. The shift in FDI causes host wages to rise while wages elsewhere fall. The host country with the lower natural attractiveness for FDI (absent intervention) adopts a smaller tax on multinational production. Coordination between hosts eliminates the FDI diversion effect and leads them to impose a harmonized FDI tax that is larger than their non-cooperative tax levels. </section>
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Glass, Amy Jocelyn ; Saggi, Kamal |
Published in: |
International Journal of Economic Theory. - The International Society for Economic Theory, ISSN 1742-7355. - Vol. 10.2014, 1, p. 91-106
|
Publisher: |
The International Society for Economic Theory |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
International Technology Transfer: The Role of Foreign Direct Investment
Glass, Amy Jocelyn,
-
Intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment
Glass, Amy Jocelyn, (2002)
-
FDI policies under shared factor markets
Glass, Amy Jocelyn, (1999)
- More ...