Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bonifacio, Agustín G. ; Juarez, Noelia ; Neme, Pablo ; Oviedo, Jorge |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 53.2024, 1, p. 143-157
|
Subject: | Core | Matching with indifferences | Stability | Strong core | Strong stability | Super core | Super stability | Matching | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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