Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Kawamori, Tomohiko |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 9.2021, 2, p. 259-267
|
Subject: | Collective choice | Decision rule | Core | Bargaining | Perfect patience | Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory |
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