Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution
Year of publication: |
1997-12-31
|
---|---|
Authors: | CURRARINI, Sergio ; TULKENS, Henry |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | voting games | core | international cooperation | pollution | political equilibrium |
-
The core of voting games : a partition approach
Lardon, Aymeric, (2015)
-
Rosenmüller, Joachim, (2001)
-
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
Kumabe, Masahiro, (2008)
- More ...
-
Stable international agreements on transfrontier pollution with ratification constraints
CURRARINI, Sergio,
-
Stable international agreements on transfrontier pollution with ratification constraints
CURRARINI, Sergio,
-
Inflation, welfare, and public goods
BLOISE, Gaetano,
- More ...