Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms.
This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Agrawal, Anup ; Nagarajan, Nandu J |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 45.1990, 4, p. 1325-31
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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